發文作者:oskarshen | 2008/09/25 星期四

吳叡人談「進步本土主義」

本文是時代精神讀書會,邀請吳叡人教授的訪談紀要。

時間:2008年夏。

地點:中央研究院人文館八樓。

 
《關於「進步本土主義」的談話》

一、概念的緣起背景:

「進步本土主義」是一個進步性思維的想法,當初貿然提出這個概念,現在覺得有點後悔,因為要把這個觀念討論清楚不是一件容易的事。不過這是我自己闖的禍,因為既然我在2006年七一五行動時公開使用了這個term,就應該要負責任說明它的意涵。其實,這種涉及「大戰略」的思考不能期待個別理論家,而必須靠所有各專業領域的學者相互分工合作,才有可能形成。現在想想,我在「七一五」時犯的兩件大錯,一是提出「進步本土」,一是提出「轉型正義」。前者提出之後缺乏充分的說明,後者則不幸被政治性地挪用,以致我現在必須出面進行收尾,以向臺灣社會表示負責之意。

關於何謂「本土」的問題,我在七一五的發言中,其實主要是在當時臺灣既有的公共論述語彙的脈絡之中,也就是在七○年代以來黨外民主運動史上習用的「本土/外來」這組軸線上,沿用並再創造既有的詞彙。我無意涉入關於「本土」一詞的語意學上的爭辯,也不特別覺得必須拘泥於「本土」這個名詞。我只不過使用了民進黨最重要的政治語彙,用來和他們對話而已。另外,我當時對「進步」這個詞彙,也沒有進行哲學論述上精確的界定。後來想想,確實應該要有更為清楚的界定。整體來講,我所謂「進步本土」所指涉的意涵,是素樸、單純的。我的思考前提是,台灣是一個形成中的nation-state,而我們應該讓這個過程完成(也就是所謂國家「正常化」)。在這個前提預設下,我主張選擇政治光譜中比較左,或者一般被理解為比較進步的道路,來完成這個民族國家形成的歷史工程。

這是我觀察研究臺灣政治史和政治思想史得到的一點心得。我認為臺灣民族國家的形成,是一個持續在發生中的歷史現象。基本上,它是數百年來東北亞地緣政治的產物,臺灣近代政治思想史也反映了這個地緣政治的深刻影響。基於這個臺灣政治史與思想史的認識,我認為促成臺灣民族國家形成的歷史工程之完成,是一個正當、合理而且可欲的目標。在這個預設下,我試圖進行一個關於「進步本土」的系統性思考。

如果台灣要形成一個民族國家(這是指國際政治上通行的主權國家「形式」,而比較不涉及關於臺灣nation組成要素的討論),已無可能複製十九世紀民族國家形成那種由上而下,以國家暴力抹除差異的作法,而必須透過由下而上,以非脅迫的方式,透過有效的治理,創造政治正當性,從而鞏固共同體。換句話說,如今nation-state building的方向必須逆轉,台灣的民族或國民形成(nation-formation)已經沒有國家主義(statism)的選項。或者說,國家強制力在這個過程中扮演的角色必須大幅降低,而「社會」取代國家成為核心。這裏,所謂「政治正當性」指的是「民主」、「進步」的一般性概念,如民主鞏固與深化、自由人權的保障、多元主義、分配正義、以及對環保、文化、教育的重視等。

2006年的時候,民進黨政府對內沒有建構出具有正當性的治理,對外則找不到外交出路,因此開始偏離當年反對運動時期所擁有的那種開放、進步的精神,逐漸走向保守與封閉。這和先前那個liberal, civic的民進黨不同。當治理失敗,又面臨外部危機,大家逐漸失信心的情形下,「民族」遂被置於「民主」「進步」之前,而民族主義現象的兩面性也就在這裡充分展現出來。換言之,一種典型的民族主義由進步到反動的週期正在發生。我們看到,如果缺乏「民主」的制約與轉化,民族主義發展可能走向歧路。在我成長過程中,臺灣民族主義是具有民主和進步價值的正當性的,但是後來的發展已經逐漸喪失這個正當性。

必須說明的是,我這個思考還不是體系性的。它比較像是在一個長期求學求知的過程中,從不同知識領域的摸索中逐步匯聚,逐步形成的一種政治思考的「傾向」。它和康德或John Rawls那種演繹式的論證推衍方式不同,也不是基於馬克思主義或者某種意識型態的先驗立場的發言,而比較是經驗的、歸納的。或許,我可以暫時將我個人對「進步本土主義」的想法,稱之為一種「經驗的、歸納的、結構的、戰略的進步主義」。

以下我會分兩部分討論自己這種思考「傾向」形成的過程。第一部分涉及個人求知歷程,第二部分涉及對現實政治的觀察。

二、個人學思歷程

I. 求學時的西方知識背景:

我的所謂「進步本土」的「傾向」為何是歸納與經驗的呢?我在八零年代末期進入芝加哥大學政研所當研究生,那時剛好是所謂actually existing socialism大失敗的時期,可以說是西方學界馬克思主義的大瓦解,全球左翼對馬克思主義出現了徬徨與遲疑的時刻。那時我跟著Jon Elster讀馬克思,讀了好一段時間。當時,在西方左翼學界之中有不少人在理論上與知識上談論馬克思主義時,開始有了「存其神去其形」的想法,也就是認為:馬克思問對了問題,可是給錯了答案。我剛好碰到這批人,他們被稱為「分析馬克思主義者」(analytical Marxists)。Jon Elster寫了一本Making sense of Marxism (這本書被Michael Buroway (結構馬克思主義者)批評為making nonsense)。Elster是一個方法論上的個人主義者,認為社會分析必須從個別行動者出發,強調行動者的能動性,並且認為必須跳脫傳統的階級觀念來談這個問題。這個群體的成員,還有美國的John E. Roemer及Adam Przeworski,以及英國的J.A. Cohen(他在八零年代和Elster有一場關於馬克思主義與功能論的辯論,後來化敵為友。)Roemer試圖用數學來計算何謂「剝削」等概念,而Przeworski則用數學模型討論階級鬥爭,並且證明國家對資本的結構性依賴關係。這個思考路數和傳統的馬克思主義者很不同。當然,儘管我讀了一些馬克思的作品,可是絕對不能說是真正的瞭解馬克思。當時我還跟著在芝大校園附近開「士林書店」的林孝信一起讀Paul Sweezy,也和台獨左翼前輩讀過列寧。老林和獨左的朋友對馬克思的信仰是很真實的,儘管他們政治立場不同。

最終,我同意或者接受了Elster對馬克思的評價:我們必須以嚴謹的社會科學知識檢驗馬克思的主張,他的論證有些依然有效,但有些已經站不住腳;不過,他超人的熱情與關懷是非常可貴的,因此必須保留下來。這個評價,成為我對左翼思考的基礎。對於馬克思以及社會主義的人道與弱勢關懷,我深受所感動,對於他對資本主義分析的若干洞見,我也很佩服,但我對於任何教條主義的宣稱都非常反感,也很厭惡大聲吹噓自己是「左派」但卻沒有思想內容,或者根本是「左言右行」的人。相反的,我很重視為實踐尋求堅實的經驗知識基礎。事實上,想要實踐社會主義,人民必須具備某些civic virtues,沒有公共virtues,社會主義不容易實現。換句話說,人性必須被加以改造。我問過老林,有些頹廢主義或個人主義的文學或藝術作品,比如波特萊爾的詩,恐怕會妨礙這些civic virtues的形成吧。他毫不猶豫地回答說:「如果有妨礙,就應該要加以鎮壓。」(!)我也曾聽過老林的臺灣民主支援會的理論家(熊三)提到說,他正在思考佛教對於改造人類自私性格,塑造公民德行的可能性。我親身接觸到社會主義者在知識與實踐上的徬徨,這個經驗,於我而言是一個除魅的過程,使我此後極端厭惡那種其實非常唯心的歷史必然論與教條主義的思考傾向。

在分析馬克思主義者之後,我又接觸到另一種思潮,就是Laclau和Mouffe等人的「後馬克思主義」,也就是日後的「激進民主派」。Laclau在Hegemony and Socialist Strategy一書指出,「階級」並不具有先驗的優先地位,每個時代都有屬於那個時代的主要矛盾,這是經驗問題,而且不斷變動。這個思考更加深了我反教條主義的傾向。

另外,後現代主義的解構利刃對任何主體形成的計畫都構成了嚴重的挑戰。在這個思潮下,不要說民族或國家,連個別主體也被瓦解了。這個解構風潮也影響到民族主義研究。從Gellner到Anderson以來對民族主義的解構,對於想要justify台灣主體性的台灣人來說,在知識上是一個很大的挑戰,是一個非常困難的事情。台灣人如何一方面解構壓迫者強加的認同,另一方面又去justify自己的認同?如果想要為這個兩難困境尋求解決方案,就不可能接受簡單的教條主義思考。借用Ernest Mandel的「晚期資本主義」概念,我認為台灣民族主義是一個「晚期民族主義」(late nationalism),它在1920年代全球反殖民運動浪潮中出現,但是大多數國家到了1960年代就獨立了,但是台灣一直到今天為止都沒有真正解除殖民,獲得獨立。Anderson講的last wave nationalism還在延續。這種「晚期民族主義」現象的特徵之一,就是它面臨一個對民族主義非常有敵意的當代知識與道德氛圍,已經不再擁有早期反殖民民族主義的那種單純不受質疑的正當性。連帶的,早期民族主義被容許使用的政治行動選項(如透過國家力量塑造認同)也已不再被容許。在這種不利的條件下,只會空講「愛台灣」而不考慮當代主流的進步政治價值,如平等、多元、差異等,是難以被接受的。不過在另一方面,如果不完成民族國家建構,或者共同體形成,不先界定共同體的成員範圍,根本無法實現分配正義。(這是英國社會主義哲學家David Miller的看法。我很贊成。)所以,我對於一味講「愛台灣」者,或者只想談「階級」不願意面對民族問題者,都有一點保留。

II. 對「台灣」的省思歷程:

我進行台灣研究最初的動機,是出於一個古典的民族主義者的立場。我的動機是實踐的,而非純粹知識的。我研究台灣的目的,在試圖理解世界史中「台灣」的形成,並且用知識來辯護台灣認同。借用Anderson的話說,我想「透過台灣研究,將台灣送上世界的知識地圖上」。這個具有實踐意含的政治研究,是我思考上很重要的起點。以下我分四個領域報告自己思考形成的緩慢歷程:政治哲學、西洋和台灣政治思想史、比較政治和台灣政治史、後殖民研究。

〈政治哲學〉

我比較認真思考台灣問題,最早是由政治哲學上回應後現代主義的挑戰開始的。如同前面所說的,我們已經不能以十九世紀民族國家形成期那種由上而下的作法,來建立一個台灣主體了。今天我們的課題是:如何建立台灣主體,而又不在這個過程中壓迫他人。這也就是盧梭在《民約論》開宗明義所說:尋找一個政治體制,在其中我們既團結在一起,而又不會喪失個人自由。換句話說,這就是「自由與共同體」的問題。九零年代初期我跟著法國籍的Bernard Manin研究盧梭,並且針對這個問題寫了一篇論文。後來短暫回到台灣,我又借用漢娜‧鄂蘭與托克維爾(「美國的民主」)的說法,寫了一篇論文,重構台灣民族主義的哲學基礎,幾乎把所謂「台灣人」的本質性給抽光。換句話說,我在摸索一種非本質主義的,開放的主體建構的理論可能。這個想法的源頭是盧梭的共和主義,然後再沿著托克維爾、鄂蘭的線,還有Carole Pateman的參與民主理論,發展成某種civic nationalism的主體建構路線。再說一次,台灣無法效法德國、日本,甚至中國民族主義那樣走向文化、血統論述的路子。

〈西洋/(日本)/台灣政治思想史〉

除了政治哲學,另一個促使我思考台灣的契機是西洋政治思想史。台灣的四百年政治史到底具有什麼「文明史」的意義或教訓呢?這是芝加哥大學所謂Leo Strauss學派政治思想史給我的啟示,因為Leo Srauss的整個政治思想史計畫,就是一個藉由二十世紀猶太人遭遇來重新檢視西方文明的計畫。長期受Strauss學派師長的薰陶,我開始思考:那麼台灣四百年政治史,台灣的歷史經驗,又具有什麼可能的文明史意義呢?這是一種高層次的主體建構計畫的想法。我認為台灣的知識人應該要有這樣的格局。

西洋政治思想史的訓練同時也刺激了我對台灣思想史的思考。如果Leo Strauss指引了我一條探討文明史的思想史作法,那麼劍橋學派的Quentin Skinner的英國思想史計畫,則鼓舞了我進行經由歷史詮釋建構台灣政治思想史的努力。文明史和民族史,這是兩個不同層次的台灣思想史作法,我希望將他們合而為一,從思想上建構台灣主體,讓這個主體不只是台灣的,同時也是世界的。

(必須補充的是,丸山真男的日本政治思想史研究也給我很大的啟示,這個啟示主要在他如何透過文本重新詮釋建構日本本土的現代性傳統,或者凸顯本土的進步傳統這個思想計畫之上。不過,關於日本思想史的部分就等將來有機會再說吧。)

當然,我的哲學立場選擇,已經決定了我在思想史的詮釋策略,也就是說,我試圖進行一種非本質主義式的台灣政治思想史建構。例如,獨派喜歡說「台灣人四百年來…」,這是一種典型的本質主義宣稱,和「中華民族五千年來」之類的說法是一樣的。問題是四百年前「台灣人」尚未出現啊。從思想史角度對台獨歷史論述進行非本質主義的重構,我最早寫的是關於彭明敏的「台灣自救宣言」的分析(後來才知道那是謝聰敏寫的,所以我的文章似乎要重寫了)。在這篇文章中,我給自救宣言一個非常進步的詮釋,刻意凸顯本外省人可以一起合作建國這點,並將這篇宣言定位為台灣公民民族主義之濫觴。剛好彭明敏在京都第三高等學校時也愛讀Ernest Renan的作品(特別是Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?),因此詮釋起來很順。後來一篇作品是寫戰後台獨思想之父廖文奎(廖文毅的哥哥,第一個台灣人的芝加哥大學哲學博士,實用主義大將George Herbert Mead的學生)。在這篇文章中,我分析了一個前「祖國派」在對祖國幻滅後如何情境性的,工具性的使用「祖國」的思想來反抗祖國。由這個角度來看,戰後獨派的立場從一開始就不是很本質主義的,而是有歷史性的。

要補充一點的是,後來回台任職後,我也開始注意到台灣民族主義似乎有逐漸保守反動的傾向。我長期受到Frantz Fanon等人的影響,一直在追求超越後殖民民族主義困境的途徑。也就是說,只有民族獨立是不夠的,還需要社會解放,否則只有獨立形式,反而可能出現和新殖民者合作的新買辦階級。當陳水扁旁邊出現了吳禮涪(美國)和辜寬敏(日本)時,我心中忍不住會擔心,如果沒有進步社會力量的出現,台灣可能出現一個跨國資本主宰的新殖民體制。從這個思考出發,我也在台灣政治思想史的研究計畫中,加入了「台灣左翼傳統」的研究,希望從台灣本土的左翼實踐經驗中,尋找到有用的教訓,作為當代進步本土論述的養分。這個思考,同時也是對當代後殖民批評的一個回應。

至於台灣的左翼人士,雖然很有正義感,但他們的論述中似乎總是缺少台灣本土的脈絡,也忽略了人的情感,忽略了人的認同需求,結果在實踐上就缺乏力量。結果,台灣知識界出現了奇特的結盟,獨派在知識上讓出左翼,放左翼給統派或「不統不獨」派。我進行「台灣左翼傳統」的研究的一個政治的理由,也是想要打破當代統派對「左」的壟斷。在我看來,他們中國民族主義的成分高過「左」。

〈比較政治/台灣政治史〉

關於台灣政治史的研究,我在三個階段的摸索當中,逐漸累積出一些對台灣政治史的思考。必須說明的是,我稱這些研究為「台灣政治史」的目的,在試圖建構台灣人的政治史意識,事實上這些研究從學科觀點而言可以說都是比較政治或歷史社會學的勞作。我借用自己的三篇論文說明這些思考的發展。

1. The Formosan Ideology (2003)

這篇博士論文的purpose是多重的,前半部是比較殖民主義、比較國家形成,以及比較民族主義的研究,後半部則是對台灣政治史上出現過的二三零年代的台灣民族主義進行意識形態分析。今天我們不談前半部,只談台灣政治史。在這裏,我提出一個觀念:Geopolitically,台灣處在一種「雙重邊陲」的位置—日本明治之後試圖「脫亞入歐」被西方拒絕,只好「脫歐返亞」,因此在地緣政治結構上一直處於西方的邊陲,而台灣則一直在日本的邊陲。我稱呼這是一種「雙重邊緣性」(double marginality)的狀態:日本被西方壓抑,台灣則被日本壓抑,所以台灣民族主義在抵抗策略上選擇支持西方價值,也就是「遠交近攻」,選擇敵人的敵人。這是一個現代性的論述結盟。換言之,我的看法是地緣政治的位置會shape某種意識形態的傾向。台灣政治運動中這種「作為解放的現代性」的意識形態傾向,一直到今日還是很強,因為台灣處在雙重邊緣這個地緣政治結構到今天還沒有改變。戰後國民黨六零年代推動的「中華文化復興運動」和戰前日本天皇制意識型態一樣,都是某種折衷主義的,半學習西方半反對西方的新傳統主義意識型態,因此台灣的獨派一直可以利用強烈現代性傾向,來批判統治者的封建和不完整的現代性。另外,當代中國崛起後,東北亞的地緣政治結構幾乎與戰前一模一樣:中國位於西方邊陲,台灣被壓擠在中國邊陲,所以當代中國知識份子都對西方有複雜的resentment,既模仿西方,又反西方,既反霸又想自己稱霸,而台灣民族主義則沒有這種complex,明快地選擇「脫亞入歐」,與西方現代接櫫的啟蒙普世價值連結。

因此,對我來說,所謂「進步本土」路線,不來自新馬,也不來自任何教條,而是從台灣政治史上的這個結構性條件歷史脈絡之中產生的。這是一種結合了政治史、思想史與比較政治的,具有脈絡的思考方式。

2. Fragment Of/f Empires (2004)

在The Formosan Ideology的基礎上,我寫了一篇台灣民族主義形成的歷史社會學分析:Fragment of/f Emipires (2004)。這是我之前在日本發表的文章,希望有一天可以發展成一本書。在文章中,我提出一個觀念:台灣民族國家的雛形是在複數個帝國壓擠的地緣政治結構下產生的,但同樣也受限於這個結構而無法完成民族國家形成。

3. Discontinuous and cumulative nation-state formation (2007)

去年八月,我借用Charles Tilly的民族國家形成的歷史社會學理論,也就是民主,民族,國家三位一體形成的架構,來分析台灣這塊土地上所出現的state如何在台灣進行互相矛盾的國家建構與認同塑造,以及這些不連續的,乃至相互矛盾的統治作為所產生的制度性後果,如何以一種累積的方式慢慢型塑了一個以「台灣」為邊界的民族國家。這其實是前一篇論文Fragment Of/f Empires的續篇,從另一個側面(國家)探討「台灣」的形成。如果借用盧梭的說法,這些不同的國家統治在制度上的效應,是一種「from man to citizen」的過程。用Tilly的架構分析,台灣的政治史雖然是斷裂的,但制度累積面來看,卻毫無疑問是一個民族國家形成的過程。事實上,台灣的民主化也必須presume共同體的出現。因此,我不會像一些台派的朋友那樣的緊張,要是馬做了太冒進的動作,社會一定會有反彈。因為,「台灣國」或者「中華民國在台灣」的形成,是長期歷史積累的結果,不是任何一個單一政治人物可以簡單invent或undo。如果馬英九認為他可以個人政治操作解消「台灣」,那他必然要付出慘痛的政治代價。

〈後殖民研究〉

雖然我很關心後殖民批判的問題,我始終沒有很刻意進行後殖民研究,因為我想從經驗面把殖民主義和民族主義這些現象先弄清楚再說。畢竟「後殖民」是一種政治態度,而想在政治上表態,最好在知識上先釐清一些基本事實。我用兩篇相關的文章說明自己關於這個主題的想法。

1. 〈台灣後殖民論綱〉(2006)

在台灣或日本的後殖民研究,大多是文學,修辭學之類的研究,但是我認為必須先對於何謂「殖民」,有清楚的經驗性認識,才能進行關於「後殖民」的理論或概念建構。後殖民研究從頭到尾都是政治性的,因此如果沒有足夠的關於「殖民」「殖民主義」的經驗性、歷史性研究,很有可能變成個人政治立場的表明而沒有任何知識內容。2005年時剛好台灣歷史學會主辦一個「終戰六十週年」研究會,討論戰後各國獨立經驗,主辦單位找我寫一篇討論台獨與後殖民主義關係的論文,所以那時我把這篇論文當一個mental exercise來寫,想要把後殖民邏輯放在台灣的情境中推演一次。基本上,我從台灣是「多重殖民」和「連續殖民」這個歷史前提出發,探討如何建立一個開放的台灣主體的策略。我從漢族裔台灣人為主體的反殖民運動歷史經驗中抽繹出兩個有用的教訓。第一個是台灣民眾黨所提出的「台灣人全體」概念,這是在1927年台灣民族運動左右派交鋒論爭當中產生出來的一個開放性的「台灣人」概念。我認為這是台灣左翼傳統留給我們的一個寶貴的legacy,因為當時左派提醒右派「台灣人」只包括仕紳和地主,卻排除了絕大多數的農民和工人。結果連右翼的陳逢源、蔡培火也被迫同意擴大「台灣人」概念。換句話說,台灣左翼的批判糾正了右傾台灣民族主義的保守傾向。第二個教訓是前面所說的「雙重邊陲性」狀況中孕生的台灣人抵抗策略:遠交近攻,與「作為解放的現代性」結盟。在現實中這意味著與西方,以及「日本內部的西方」結盟,而這意味著「殖民者」「西方」乃至「日本」「中國」同樣沒有一成不變的本質,同樣可以裂解成「殖民」和「反殖民」的陣營,同樣可以依循某種共享的進步價值結盟。這也是歷史的教訓。

這兩個教訓,都是我多年研究台灣政治史的心得,不是個人感想或者空談。我在寫這篇文章時,第一次真真切切地體會到「後殖民」如何是「反殖民」的延長,是有具體歷史內容的,也第一次體會到一種扎扎實實的「有根據的理論化」工作給人的愉快感覺。

2. 〈賤民宣言〉(2008)

〈賤民宣言〉是去年九月應韓國延世大學歷史學者白永瑞之邀而寫的。當時他們那批韓國學者選擇台灣、沖繩、越南三地,和在地的學者坐下來談一整天關於「如何在帝國交錯的地帶逃離帝國」這個主題。對這個問題我想了很久,後來判斷我們沒有任何機會逃離帝國,最好也只能像許世楷他們的主張一樣,找一個親近的強國如美國或日本來取得支持。寫作時,我想到「被迫向善」恐怕是處在帝國夾縫中的台灣人唯一的選擇,否則只能當附庸。當然,經濟一直是一個重要課題。當我六月底在西雅圖與Pheang Cheah(謝平)這個後殖民研究專家對話時,提到台灣的矛盾處境:經濟上具有殖民鄰近貧窮國家的實力,政治上卻是強權的殖民地。這種同時殖民與被殖民的矛盾處境使台灣人處在一種雙重「非人」的情境:一方面工具化鄰國的勞動者,一方面被國際強權當成棋子(工具化)。要怎麼解決這個困境?我當時的說法是,台灣人在地緣政治與國際政治上,除了持續維持某種對友善強權的現實主義依賴關係之外,恐怕只剩下與global civil society接軌的選擇。和全球公民社會的普世人權價值接軌,使我們可以一面抗拒強權現實主義政治對我們的工具化,一方面可以抗拒自己內在渴望將鄰國勞動者工具化的傾向。在這裏我借用了一個尼采道德系譜學的觀念,也就是如何將被壓迫者的resentment轉為道德的可能性。不過,這個思考方向是純政治的,缺少了經濟的面向,但是在思考台灣人如何逃離帝國夾縫時,我們不能忽略搜尋經濟上的出路。無論是大航海時代的trade,還是後來的帝國主義,主導台灣歷史發展的兩個力量,始終是state與economy。所以,如何能夠在經濟上考量現實提出一個和前面所說的「進步本土」的思考相容的model,這要大家來思考。翻成社會科學語言來說,台灣有沒有一條「進步的經濟民族主義」的路線之可能?這個問題超出了我個人專業的能力,需要就教於真正的高手。事實上,我自己對於做所謂「大理論」有非常大的懷疑。我認為建構國家願景,是一個需要投入一兩個世代知識份子努力的工程,得大家一起來打拼。

三、對台灣政治現實的觀察(本段省略)

民主化與台灣民族主義之間的辯證關係:民主化→台灣民族主義的主流化、(工具)理性化與激進化→墮落或反動化?

四、結論:

最後,讓我們模仿列寧說:What is to be done? 簡單說,我們必須有一個進步的經濟戰略,能夠與進步的政治戰略相容並且發揮相乘效果。最重要的,我們需要一個思想運動,結合好幾個世代的努力,共同思考台灣的出路。我用這句Hanna Arendt 很喜歡的格言送給各位,並與大家相互勉勵:

“Amor Fati, Amor Mundi” (熱愛命運,熱愛世界)

如果困境是台灣人的共同命運,那麼讓我們熱愛這個命運,並且更堅定的面對這個世界,因為這也是我們的世界,不管它對我們多麼不公平。

(2008/10/22修訂完成)

廣告

Responses

  1. 請問可以轉寄本文嗎?
    會註明出處。謝謝。

  2. 歡迎取用。

  3. The Long Telegram

    861.00/2 – 2246: Telegram
    The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
    SECRET
    Moscow, February 22, 1946–9 p.m. [Received February 22–3: 52 p.m.]
    511. Answer to Dept’s 284, Feb 3 [13] involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows:
    (1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook.
    (2) Background of this outlook
    (3) Its projection in practical policy on official level.
    (4) Its projection on unofficial level.
    (5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.
    I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel; but questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it at once. There follows:

    Part 1: Basic Features of Post War Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine
    Are as Follows:
    (a) USSR still lives in antagonistic “capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers:
    “In course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world."
    (b) Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and US.
    (c) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states, and wars of intervention against socialist world. Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of capitalism, incline toward latter.
    (d) Intervention against USSR, while it would be disastrous to those who undertook it, would cause renewed delay in progress of Soviet socialism and must therefore be forestalled at all costs.
    (e) Conflicts between capitalist states, though likewise fraught with danger for USSR, nevertheless hold out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant leadership.
    (f) It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is not all bad. In addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it includes (1) certain wholly enlightened and positive elements united in acceptable communistic parties and (2) certain other elements (now described for tactical reasons as progressive or democratic) whose reactions, aspirations and activities happen to be “objectively" favorable to interests of USSR. These last must be encouraged and utilized for Soviet purposes.
    (g) Among negative elements of bourgeois-capitalist society, most dangerous of all are those whom Lenin called false friends of the people, namely moderate-socialist or social-democratic leaders (in other words, non-Communist left-wing). These are more dangerous than out-and-out reactionaries, for latter at least march under their true colors, whereas moderate left-wing leaders confuse people by employing devices of socialism to seine interests of reactionary capital.
    So much for premises. To what deductions do they lead from standpoint of Soviet policy? To following:
    (a) Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity must be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers.
    (b) Soviet efforts, and those of Russia’s friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an “imperialist" war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries.
    (c) “Democratic-progressive" elements abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.
    (d) Relentless battle must be waged against socialist and social-democratic leaders abroad.

    Part 2: Background of Outlook
    Before examining ramifications of this party line in practice there are certain aspects of it to which I wish to draw attention.
    First, it does not represent natural outlook of Russian people. Latter are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor. Party line only represents thesis which official propaganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public often remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But party line is binding for outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power–party, secret police and Government–and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.
    Second, please note that premises on which this party line is based are for most part simply not true. Experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible. Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of production, but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness. Internal rivalries of capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are attributable to this cause. To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and after example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces of intolerance and subversion “capitalist" world of today is quite capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia. Finally, no sane person has reason to doubt sincerity of moderate socialist leaders in Western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success of their efforts to improve conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia, they have been given chance to show what they could do.
    Falseness of those premises, every one of which predates recent war, was amply demonstrated by that conflict itself Anglo-American differences did not turn out to be major differences of Western World. Capitalist countries, other than those of Axis, showed no disposition to solve their differences by joining in crusade against USSR. Instead of imperialist war turning into civil wars and revolution, USSR found itself obliged to fight side by side with capitalist powers for an avowed community of aim.
    Nevertheless, all these theses, however baseless and disproven, are being boldly put forward again today. What does this indicate? It indicates that Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of situation beyond Russia’s borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war and exist today.
    At bottom of Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.
    It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin’s interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes most always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven [by?] necessities of their own past and present position to put forward which [apparent omission] outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final Coup de grace by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.
    It should not be thought from above that Soviet party line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of all those who put it forward. Many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too dependent to question [apparent omission] self-hypnotism, and who have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this Government, possibilities for distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth–indeed, their disbelief in its existence–leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. There is good reason to suspect that this Government is actually a conspiracy within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world. Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which Russians are past masters. Inability of foreign governments to place their case squarely before Russian policy makers–extent to which they are delivered up in their relations with Russia to good graces of obscure and unknown advisors whom they never see and cannot influence–this to my mind is most disquieting feature of diplomacy in Moscow, and one which Western statesmen would do well to keep in mind if they would understand nature of difficulties encountered here.

    Part 3: Projection of Soviet Outlook in Practical Policy on Official Level
    We have now seen nature and background of Soviet program. What may we expect by way of its practical implementation?
    Soviet policy, as Department implies in its query under reference, is conducted on two planes: (1) official plane represented by actions undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and (2) subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government does not admit responsibility.
    Policy promulgated on both planes will be calculated to serve basic policies (a) to (d) outlined in part 1. Actions taken on different planes will differ considerably, but will dovetail into each other in purpose, timing and effect.
    On official plane we must look for following:
    (a) Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark.
    (b) Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm. However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a “friendly Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under Communist control, question of Soviet base at Gibraltar Strait might be activated. But such claims will appear on official level only when unofficial preparation is complete.
    (c) Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO not the mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued. As long as UNO is considered here to serve this purpose, Soviets will remain with it. But if at any time they come to conclusion that it is serving to embarrass or frustrate their aims for power expansion and if they see better prospects for pursuit of these aims along other lines, they will not hesitate to abandon UNO. This would imply, however, that they felt themselves strong enough to split unity of other nations by their withdrawal to render UNO ineffective as a threat to their aims or security, replace it with an international weapon more effective from their viewpoint. Thus Soviet attitude toward UNO will depend largely on loyalty of other nations to it, and on degree of vigor, decisiveness and cohesion with which those nations defend in UNO the peaceful and hopeful concept of international life, which that organization represents to our way of thinking. I reiterate, Moscow has no abstract devotion to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical.
    (d) Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced Western nations, on theory that in so far as this policy is successful, there will be created a vacuum which will favor Communist-Soviet penetration. Soviet pressure for participation in trusteeship arrangements thus represents, in my opinion, a desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion of Western influence at such points rather than to provide major channel for exerting of Soviet power. Latter motive is not lacking, but for this Soviets prefer to rely on other channels than official trusteeship arrangements. Thus we may expect to find Soviets asking for admission everywhere to trusteeship or similar arrangements and using levers thus acquired to weaken Western influence among such peoples.
    (e) Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense strong possibilities of opposition to Western centers of power. This applies to such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern countries, etc.
    (f) In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be underlying policy. As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet clear. Soviet Government has shown strange reticence since termination hostilities on subject foreign trade. If large scale long term credits should be forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip service, as it did in 1930’s to desirability of building up international economic exchanges in general. Otherwise I think it possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviet’s own security sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic collaboration among nations.
    (g) With respect to cultural collaboration, lip service will likewise be rendered to desirability of deepening cultural contacts between peoples, but this will not in practice be interpreted in any way which could weaken security position of Soviet peoples. Actual manifestations of Soviet policy in this respect will be restricted to arid channels of closely shepherded official visits and functions, with superabundance of vodka and speeches and dearth of permanent effects.
    (h) Beyond this, Soviet official relations will take what might be called “correct" course with individual foreign governments, with great stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Union and its representatives and with punctilious attention to protocol as distinct from good manners.

    Part 4: Following May Be Said as to What We May Expect by Way of Implementation of Basic Soviet Policies on Unofficial, or Subterranean Plane, i.e. on Plane for Which Soviet Government Accepts no Responsibility
    Agencies utilized for promulgation of policies on this plane are following:
    1. Inner central core of Communist Parties in other countries. While many of persons who compose this category may also appear and act in unrelated public capacities, they are in reality working closely together as an underground operating directorate of world communism, a concealed Comintern tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow. It is important to remember that this inner core is actually working on underground lines, despite legality of parties with which it is associated.
    2. Rank and file of Communist Parties. Note distinction is drawn between those and persons defined in paragraph 1. This distinction has become much sharper in recent years. Whereas formerly foreign Communist Parties represented a curious (and from Moscow’s standpoint often inconvenient) mixture of conspiracy and legitimate activity, now the conspiratorial element has been neatly concentrated in inner circle and ordered underground, while rank and file–no longer even taken into confidence about realities of movement–are thrust forward as bona fide internal partisans of certain political tendencies within their respective countries, genuinely innocent of conspiratorial connection with foreign states. Only in certain countries where communists are numerically strong do they now regularly appear and act as a body. As a rule they are used to penetrate, and to influence or dominate, as case may be, other organizations less likely to be suspected of being tools of Soviet Government, with a view to accomplishing their purposes through [apparent omission] organizations, rather than by direct action as a separate political party.
    3. A wide variety of national associations or bodies which can be dominated or influenced by such penetration. These include: labor unions, youth leagues, women’s organizations, racial societies, religious societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing houses, etc.
    4. International organizations which can be similarly penetrated through influence over various national components. Labor, youth and women’s organizations are prominent among them. Particular, almost vital importance is attached in this connection to international labor movement. In this, Moscow sees possibility of sidetracking western governments in world affairs and building up international lobby capable of compelling governments to take actions favorable to Soviet interests in various countries and of paralyzing actions disagreeable to USSR.
    5. Russian Orthodox Church, with its foreign branches, and through it the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.
    6. Pan-Slav movement and other movements (Azerbaijan, Armenian, Turcoman, etc.) based on racial groups within Soviet Union.
    7. Governments or governing groups willing to lend themselves to Soviet purposes in one degree or another, such as present Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments, North Persian regime, Chinese Communists, etc. Not only propaganda machines but actual policies of these regimes can be placed extensively at disposal of USSR.
    It may be expected that component parts of this far-flung apparatus will be utilized in accordance with their individual suitability, as follows:
    (a) To undermine general political and strategic potential of major western powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to spelt redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents, etc.
    (b) On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken power and influence of Western Powers of [on] colonial backward, or dependent peoples. On this level, no holds will be barred. Mistakes and weaknesses of western colonial administration will be mercilessly exposed and exploited. Liberal opinion in Western countries will be mobilized to weaken colonial policies. Resentment among dependent peoples will be stimulated. And while latter are being encouraged to seek independence of Western Powers, Soviet dominated puppet political machines will be undergoing preparation to take over domestic power in respective colonial areas when independence is achieved.
    (c) Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran), where they seal their territories off against Communist penetration (Switzerland, Portugal), or where they compete too strongly, like Labor Government in England, for moral domination among elements which it is important for Communists to dominate. (Sometimes, two of these elements are present in a single case. Then Communist opposition becomes particularly shrill and savage. )
    (d) In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule, work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence, economic, political or moral. Their system can handle only individuals who have been brought into complete dependence on higher power. Thus, persons who are financially independent–such as individual businessmen, estate owners, successful farmers, artisans and all those who exercise local leadership or have local prestige, such as popular local clergymen or political figures, are anathema. It is not by chance that even in USSR local officials are kept constantly on move from one job to another, to prevent their taking root.
    (e) Everything possible will be done to set major Western Powers against each other. Anti-British talk will be plugged among Americans, anti-American talk among British. Continentals, including Germans, will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; where not, ignited. No effort will be spared to discredit and combat all efforts which threaten to lead to any sort of unity or cohesion among other [apparent omission] from which Russia might be excluded. Thus, all forms of international organization not amenable to Communist penetration and control, whether it be the Catholic [apparent omission] international economic concerns, or the international fraternity of royalty and aristocracy, must expect to find themselves under fire from many, and often [apparent omission].
    (f) In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is doming. But behind all this will be applied insistent, unceasing pressure for penetration and command of key positions in administration and especially in police apparatus of foreign countries. The Soviet regime is a police regime par excellence, reared in the dim half world of Tsarist police intrigue, accustomed to think primarily in terms of police power. This should never be lost sight of in ganging Soviet motives.

    Part 5: Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy
    In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world’s greatest peoples and resources of world’s richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendentiously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve–and that without recourse to any general military conflict.. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:
    (1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw–and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.
    (2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.
    (3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin’s death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin’s death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and–for the moment–highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.
    (4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.
    For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:
    (1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.
    (2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.
    (3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meets. Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit–Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.
    (4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.
    (5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the greatest danger that can be fall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.
    KENNAN

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